The disintegration of the old Ottoman Empire started in the 19^th century with the Greek war of independence and continued rapidly throughout the 19^th century and at the beginning of the 20^th century. The Christian population of the Balkan Peninsula, often cruelly, started to breathe the air of freedom. Crete on the Greek side was finally autonomous, while Macedonia was on the road to liberation.

THE CIVIL-MILITARY SITUATION IN THE BALKANS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR I -

THE REASONS OF GREECE’S NEUTRALITY IN RELATION TO THE POSITION OF THE OTHER BALKAN STATES AND THE GREAT POWERS

PREFACE

The disintegration of the old Ottoman Empire started in the 19^th century with the Greek war of independence and continued rapidly throughout the 19^th century and at the beginning of the 20^th century.

The Christian population of the Balkan Peninsula, often cruelly, started to breathe the air of freedom. Crete on the Greek side was finally autonomous, while Macedonia was on the road to liberation.

The last Russian-Turkish war had ended with Turkey’s defeat and uttermost achievement the treaty of St. Stefano in 1878. This marked the beginning of the Bulgarian claims in Macedonia. The struggle that the Greek State undertook unofficially against the Komitadji was a fight for the survival of Hellenism in their ancestral homes. However, the newly established Bulgarian State was the bone of contention mainly between the Russians and the rest of the Great Powers, which did not take kindly to the Slavic descent in the Aegean and in the Mediterranean in general. So, the competitors made a higher bid on territorial benefits to go into partnership with the Bulgarians. In this light, one can explain the complete inactivity of the Great Powers regarding the violent dehellenisation and integration of East Rumelia (Northern Thrace) in the new state.

THE PERIOD BEFORE 1909

The Ottoman Empire was for a hundred years on the surgical table of partition and the lance was now close to its heart: Constantinople. The expected reaction of the “patient” regarding death was the chauvinistic in essence move of the Young Turks(27 July1908).

Austria-Hungary kept Bosnia-Herzegovina. There intervened the Berlin Treaty followed which abolished the Treaty of St. Stefano. The Bulgarian Sovereign Ferdinand, taking advantage of Austria-Hungary’s fervent wish to reverse the Berlin treaty to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina, gained its support for his country’s independence. So, on 5 October 1908, he declared Bulgaria’s independence in Tirnovo, which until then was paying tribute to the Sultan. With the intervention of the Western Powers and especially Russia, a Bulgarian-Turkish war was prevented and Russia renounced the total amount of compensation that Turkey owed to it, after the Russian-Turkish war of 1877. So, the defeated Turks, with no other alternative, accepted the severance, in the framework of the Czar’s “polite pressure-offer”. It is obvious that the next level of conflicts would go further south: to Macedonia. Pan-Slavism emerged as the most dangerous enemy of Hellenism.

 

STRUGGLES OF THE GREAT POWERS IN THE BALKAN PENINSULA-INTERNATIONAL CORRELATION

The Berlin Treaty, which abolished the one of St. Stefano, essentially inaugurated the policy of Pan-Germanism (Drang nach Südosten). But this policy seemed then a more remote danger, if not an unlikely ally against Slavism, especially after the official statement of the German Kaiser Wilhelm II -during his visit to Corfu- that neither he nor Austria would allow the descent of the Bulgarians in the Aegean.

Entente Cordiale was established after an English-French agreement regarding the boundary of the regions of influence of the two states in the Mediterranean. Germany felt cornered. Russia’s accession to the Entente Cordiale revealed the preference of the latter to reinforce Pan-Slavism as a counterbalance of Germanism in the Balkans, as the French ambassador Reval stated emphatically to the Greek King George I, after the meeting between the English King Edward VI and the Czar Nicholas II.¹ As a knee-jerk automatic reaction, Germany, with Italian support, approved the establishment of the state of Albania, in order to impede the pro-Entente Cordiale Serbians from controlling the Adriatic and to blockade this passage for them (Berlin Treaty).

From then on, Austria-Hungary would mainly focus on the Balkan Peninsula, since after Sadova and the Berlin treaties, it was given the authority over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Germany’s partner, Austria-Hungary, depended on Romania to the East and on Italy to the West. The Triple or Quadrilateral Alliance was becoming active and George had to find support there as well. The ambassador and subsequent Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, baron Alois von Aehrenthal, inaugurated the Mitrovica to Skopje railway. Thessalonica was only a few hours away. Germanism and Slavism had already man their battle stations. The crisis threatening world peace was stirred up by the existence of Slavic populations in Austria-Hungary, which were hostile towards their masters. In November 1907, the cession to Bagdad-bahn Company of the exploitation rights of Konya valley corresponded to the indirect colonisation of Anatolia. The Berlin Treaty had not definitively detached Bosnia-Herzegovina from Turkey, as it was conceded to Austria-Hungary for only 25 years. The latter was authorised to militarily occupy Novi Pazar. This time period had elapsed in 1903 and the territory had to be returned to Turkey. Of course, the Great Powers are not bound by their signatures and seals. So, on 15 September 1908, in Bulovic-Moldavia, baron Alois von Aehrenthal agreed with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky or Iswolsky, that Austrian -Hungary could keep the above regions as an exchange for the concession of guardianship and attachment of Bulgaria to the Pan-Slavic chariot.

 

GREECE’S POSITION-POLICY TOWARDS THE GREAT POWERS

Despite the strong Turkish protests for the above fait accompli (26 February 1909, signature of protocol for the finalisation of the annexation), the shock was more distressing for Serbia, because its national hopes were cancelled due to its separation from Montenegro and it felt suffocated by Germanism expansion. So, it was forced to sign the humiliating directive on 31 March 1909.

With their might rising, Germany/Austria-Hungary descended unrestrained towards the Aegean.

On the other hand, the Greeks worried about the English claims on Crete. Old Albion had occupied Cyprus since 1878 as a balancing move against Slavism, while it desired Souda as well, to ensure the establishment of a series of bases in the Mediterranean (Gibraltar-Malta-Souda-Cyprus).

With the purchase of Achilleion in Corfu by Wilhelm II and the simultaneous settlement of George I in Mon Repos, who declared himself satisfied regarding his contact with Wilhelm II, the French ambassador wrote to Paris: “The Kaiser’s (Wilhelm) visit that came to drive a topographical stake in the Greek territory, was not without some positive outcome”. ² Every move, no matter how negligible it seems, symbolises something. England did not take kindly to the very frequent crossings of the German naval units in the Mediterranean sea, which did not neglect to lie at anchor in Corfu as well, due also to Wilhelm’s relationship to George (later Queen Sophia was his sister). The latter influenced of course to a degree Greek foreign policy, but Germany avoided presenting itself as a force committed to the Greek national objectives. Of course Greece believed in the kind “services” of Germany to resolve the issue of Crete (Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Baltatzis).

 

The issue of Crete

We will cover this issue in great detail, because it became the catalyst and the field of policy implementation of the Powers in the East Mediterranean. It also shaped to a large extent the equilibrium and the policy of the Balkan states during the 15 years before the outbreak of World War I.

Crete became autonomous in 1897 under the suzerainty of the Sublime Port and as first high commissioner -upon Powers decision- Prince George. After his resignation in 1906, Alexandros Zaimis was appointed as his successor. Everyone realised that the union was to be gradually attained as a ripe fruit. For this to be accomplished peacefully and to ensure their presence/interests there, Entente Cordiale Forces occupied the island with their troops. Germany and Austria-Hungary avoided participation, because they did not want to annoy the Sultan. In the course of time, it was decided to conclude the occupation on 24 July 1909. But this withdrawal did not necessarily mean self-determination and by extension union with Greece, as the Young Turks emphasised, whose the coup had prevailed in Turkey since 1908. It was preceded by the events in Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Powers did not rush to make any decision, which would irritate Turkey even more. On 6 October 1909 however, the Cretans declared the union of Crete with Greece. The Powers stated that the union was under their conditional consent. The Young Turks realising the delaying tactics of the Great Powers, created a frenzied rage regarding the issue. Having withdrawn from the other fronts they needed a success as a balance. They kept a position of uncompromising resistance, to proceed at the right moment to a counter-attack. They used the known system of the policy of “national will”: public events, arranged to get out of hand and thus of great political outcome and strong impact. It was a “real campaign”, ³ according to the French consul in Constantinople, Luis Sting. As he was informed by a Young-Turk official, Greece increased its army in numbers and its geopolitical power with Crete, threatening the security of the Straits and coasts of Asia Minor and this could not be accepted by Turkey. So, Greece came under pressure from all sides to keep an “impeccable position” as: England and France were buttering up and scolding the Young-Turks, and at the same time, by criticising them for their favorable attitude towards Germany. Italy was unreliable. Russia supported Bulgaria, whose interests were opposite to the Greek ones. So, Turkey managed to refer the issue to the Greek calends. The Greek public opinion was greatly displeased … Because of this, George expressed his bitterness to the ambassadors of England and France:” The dynasty suffered the damage because of the 1897 calamity and owes its rescue to Crete’s independence. However, it is imperative that this autonomy keep its promises, otherwise the dynasty’s prestige will be irreparably undermined.” ⁴ He did not hesitate to stress that if he was deceived by the Powers, he himself would not deceive his people and announced his intent to resign.

The Turks kept up the issue with rage, threatening all the Greeks of the empire. The Kaiser in Brindisi made earnest philhellenic statements. But the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, baron Alois von Aehrenthal, immediately stated to the English ambassador in Vienna: “I did not wish to confront the Kaiser as far as his philhellenic enthusiasm is concerned, which I hope is temporary, but I can assure you that neither the German government nor our government agrees with his views and they are not going to allow unwisely new complications to the east, due to the feeling of love towards the Greek people”. ⁵

The words of the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Baltatzis, to the French ambassador were prophetic: “Believe me, the reason for the undue attention in Constantinople about the issue of Crete which is unimportant to them is to inflame the popular feeling against us. Their objective is to destroy the Greeks. The Young Turksare afraid of them, both because they are so many inside Turkey and because it is impossible to constitutionally organise their country, without granting the Greeks an important position. As they do not wish to give them anything they are entitled to, they will try to crush them by force. They use Crete as an excuse to declare the war, not only against the Hellenic Kingdom, but against all Greeks as well”. ⁶ However the Powers approved the Turkish flag flying even after their withdrawal from the island, which was supervised as flag display by a Turkish flotilla. But nothing stopped the Cretans from decorating even public buildings and the port of Chania with the Greek flag, a fact which irritated the Turks. Things were getting worse by the minute, as there were indications of troop movements in Thessalonica: the Turkish Army wanted war and the New Turks needed it. The Hellenic government held an impeccable position; it did not provoke. Nevertheless, the Cretans did not lower the flag, until the Powers did it forcibly from Chania port, by a 250-strong Marine contigent that raised Turkish flag. In Constantinople, fully satisfied, they discussed the deployment of a naval force to Souda, to maintain the Turkish flag and transform the port into a Turkish or Turkish-British or Turkish-German Gibraltar. The battle of influences culminated around the Young Turks, who played at all levels: occupation of strategic positions in view of the oncoming colossal conflict.

Under these circumstances, Greece’s fate was uncertain. It was not just about Crete only but about all the Greeks. In times like these everyone realises that “the most convincing argument of national causes is the power” (Constantine Paparrigopoulos). The nation suffered an unimaginable agony, because there was nothing it could do. It held responsible those who were taught nothing since 1897, who did not rearm the country, despite the fact that Macedonian Struggle had intervened and the war seemed inevitable.

Turkey, after the military intervention of the Young-Turks, was following the road of rebuilding and regrouping. It was time for the same to happen in Greece: it was a matter of national survival.

 

The coup of Goudi (15-28 Aug 1909)

This resulted in the coup of Goudi under the leadership of the Military League. The latter claimed and achieved the withdrawal of the Crown-Prince and the other Princes from the Army. George, humiliated, kept the throne with difficulty, with the intervention of the Great Powers. Elections were called, which were not carried out, due to the persistence of the Cretans to send their own representatives. However, a new politician appeared. Eleutherios Venizelos from Crete permanently settled in Athens for the election campaign. When he was elected to the Hellenic Parliament as member, he refuted his Cretan citizenship, due to the intense Turkish reactions. Turkey, regarding the issue of Crete, warned in every possible way that it “was going to sort” its friends. They were many who wanted to side with this power. George complained to the French that: “East Rumelia is continental and Bulgaria swallowed it like a pill. Why the Great Powers do not allow Greece to take Crete into its arms accordingly? It is the only thing that Crete demands.” ⁷ The reply came out of the mouth of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Stephen Pichon: “Turkey is strong, Bulgaria is power, but Greece is powerless. Therefore, instead of its King complaining, he should ensure his country’s necessary power for action”. ⁸

The coup of Goudi precisely filled this gap and indeed without bloodshed. The Army and Navy were extremely strengthened and Greece finally faced the Turkish threats of war in an atmosphere of relative calm.

Greek public opinion, despite Venizelos’s uneasy relations with the Palace and its division over the linguistic issue, showed a spirit of national unity. ⁹ Venizelos was elected with an overwhelming majority as Prime Minister of the country, on 16 December 1910. The Military League had found its political voice.

 

THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE-ADVERSARIES

Germany and Austria-Hungary had no intention of interfering with the Cretan issue “if the Powers did not deal with the island’s status quo. The whole case would be differentiated in case of change of its status” (Von Sein). Thus, they profited from the embarrassment of the others regarding the Greek-Turkish matters. The positions of Central Union were strengthened even more, due to the Turkish anti-Greek boycott of 1911 (embargo of Greek ships anchoring in Turkish ports). But in this way the interests of Entente Cordiale countries were also hit, since their goods were traded by such ships. The French ambassador Gabriell Deville wrote from Athens “Germany faces the Greek trade shrinkage favourably, since only the Greeks can compete with them in retail merchandise. Therefore, even if there is no absolute agreement between the members of the Triple Alliance and despite the opposition of Austria and Italy regarding the Greeks who seek an alternative flag for protection, all three have interest to continue the boycott; however, this continuation may cause many risks”. ¹⁰

At the same period (1 July 1911), because the Agadir crisis in Morocco, the French-German relations were intense. On 5 October, Italy, on the pretext of its merchants been harassed in Libya, declared war against the Sultan and occupied Tripoli.

The Balkans were set on fire. The Serbs, taking advantage of the situation, invaded Albania. The Hellenic Fleet occupied the port of Volos. The Hellenic army, fully trained and armed by France, definitely would not allow a repetition of 1897.

The French-German crisis ended, while the Italian-Turkish conflict although temporarily contained, relieved Greece from Turkish pressure and the boycott as well (16 November). In the same spirit of smoothing out of bilateral relations, Venizelos refused to accept the Cretan members of Parliament in the Hellenic Parliament.

 

THE EUROPEAN STRUGGLES IN THE BALKAN CHESSBOARD

The deteriorating crisis, caused by the continuing Italian-Turkish war, resulted in the closure of the Dardanelles, for their protection from the Italian Fleet prevailing in the Aegean. The rest of the Powers, which were hit financially, made a démarche to the Sublime Port, with no effect. The Young Turks invested wisely in the European rivalries, to come out of their difficult position. Then, word got around, regarding a mysterious French-Russian agreement to divide the East.

On 5 May 1912, the Italians completed the occupation of the Dodecanese, where they are seen as liberators: illusions of the Greek population of that region. The rest of Entente Cordiale suspected that the Central Union was behind Italy and as a consequence they could not remain inactive, despite the specific Italian assurances for a temporary occupation. France unrealistically remembered, from the shelf of history, the principle of the Ottoman Empire’s integrity. Russia was completely opposed of course, which strongly desired access to the Aegean Sea. Besides, Russia was the instigator and guarantor of the secret Serbian- Bulgarian agreement (13 March and 29 April 1912, Julian calendar dates), under the framework of which all Balkan Ottoman territory was distributed, including Macedonia unfortunately. So, the successful Macedonian struggle was not enough to save the northern Greek populations.

Greece, drawn by the developments, since nobody wanted it strong and perhaps due to Venizelos government negligence, attempted a “jump to the void” (according to Eleutherios Venizelos saying), without any guarantee for the future achievement of its national goals. So, it acceded to an agreement with Bulgaria (29 May 1912), without, however entering into a relative agreement with Serbia; thus Bulgaria became the core of the “Balkan Alliance”.

 

BALKAN WARS (BW) – THEIR INTERNATIONAL IMPACT

So, the BW I broke out (Oct 1912-Jan 1913) between Greece-Serbia-Montenegro-Bulgaria on one side and Turkey on the other. Turkey was defeated in all the fronts. The advancing Bulgarian troops reached the region outside Constantinople. The Hellenic Army [and Navy] liberated the Aegean islands, a large part of Epirus and almost all Macedonia, with the Bulgarian side being clearly displeased, because its goal was to enforce the St. Stefano Treaty.

The Greeks entered the co-reigning city as liberators, after 472 years of Ottoman occupation. King George settled in Thessalonica to give emphasis to the importance that the Greek side lent to the city, due to the Bulgarian aggressiveness. Then, George was assassinated by a teacher name Schinas, who committed suicide in prison according to official report. The motives of the assassination are unclear to this day. The heir Victorious Army Commander Constantine became King.

Bulgaria’s expansion intentions led it to attack unprovoked and without declaring war against its two former allies: Greece and Serbia. However, the trends that had been formulated after the end of BW I and due to the pressure of Austria towards Serbia, had already resulted in a Greek-Serbian alliance. Meanwhile, Crete was de facto annexed to Greece.

The English-French were concerned about the Italian occupation of the Dodecanese, despite the assurances to the opposite. The Central Union had been seriously annoyed by the Italian occupation of the Tripoli area in Libya, while at the same time it was astonished by the complete defeat of the Turks, since the victory of the Balkan Christians raised a high barricade in front of Constantinople, blocking their route to the southeast. They would react vigorously, since through the invasion of the Serbian troops to Albania, they were advancing towards Durrës, that is towards the sea, appropriating the Adriatic and blocking Austria’s route towards it.

So, an Austrian-Bulgarian alliance was emerging against Serbia and Greece. On 31 December 1912, Austria-Italy signed an agreement, by which they were bound to create an independent Albania, in which they would maintain equal spheres of influence.

With an Albanian protectorate of Italy near Vlorë, supported by Austria and Germany as vanguard of the Central Union, with the Dodecanese in Italian hands and Asia Minor under German influence, Bagdad was nearer. That meant that Greece would be surrounded from the west and east, even if it had won Crete to the south or Macedonia to the north. Moreover, the battlefield of East Mediterranean was unified.

Therefore, Greece was not in the Great Powers plans and hence ignored. It continued the operations in the Aegean, knowing that likely it will have to make costly territorial concessions, because of the lack of reliable international support. Regarding the “Front” of Macedonia, a favourable coincidence was the lack of Russia’s trust towards Bulgaria, due to the wavering position of the latter.

The statements of the eminent Captain Gotsev, Bulgaria’s military attaché in Rome, addressing his Russian and French counterpart were characteristic: “France and Russia abandoned us in the matter of Thessalonica: They will both be alienated by my country, where for various reasons, they enjoy such great sympathy. This way will be detrimental to their interests, if not directly, in any case in the very near future, because this abandonment, in a matter essential to my country, will push us in the hands of Austria and by extension to the triple Alliance, which supports us in the specific matter and in the framework of confrontation of great interests, it has proved that it is strong enough”. ¹¹

This chaos of political games led to the Treaty of London (30 May 1913). This only achieved to finalise the European territory of the Ottoman Empire (line of Ainos (Enez)-Media along Evros River). Regarding the rest, as far as the territory to the west of this line was concerned, it did not provide to whom and how it would be conceded. Also, it did not specify the status and the borders of Albania, as well as the status of the Aegean islands. Finally, it mentioned the total allied withdrawal from Crete, without any other guidelines. Turkey did not wish to be recorded that Albania was conceded to Greece, while the latter did not accept that Crete to be considered as its “profit” from the BW I. Either way, Crete was Greek in essence before the war and there was no danger of it being claimed by another power, since it fought for the Aegean and Macedonia, which were Greece’s actual profits.

By taking responsibility, the Great Powers could have completed their work and maintained peace. But they chose the role of Pontius Pilate. First and foremost they were preparing for their own Great War and besides, peace requires courage … Would they let all conflicts and all passions break out.

Greece finally was assured that it would keep Thessalonica: this caused frenzied rage in Bulgaria. The Russian public opinion supported Bulgaria and the Czar was accused of submissiveness. The Bulgarian military were not satisfied with Macedonia, Thessalonica, Monastiri: they wanted an exit to the Adriatic. The Great Powers did not dare interfere any more: they retreated to their frozen indifference and they emphatically stressed it. Through self-delusion, they expedited the Great War, instead of solving the Balkan issue at any cost, which would later set fire to the whole of Europe.

Greece was seeking support by both coalitions: it needed Entente Cordiale regarding the islands issue and the Triple Alliance regarding the Epirus and Macedonia issue, since it did not like that wavering Bulgaria would achieve an exit to the Aegean. So, the circumstances matured and the (secret) Greek-Serbian alliance (Thessalonica 1 June 1913) came as a natural consequence, putting Bulgaria in essence on the opposite side, without however raising the possibility of Russian arbitration, which was required by Bulgaria, due to its claims. This Russian interference in the Balkans caused the Triple Alliance’s expected reaction and for this reason it was to its own interest that the Balkan Peninsula problems remain unsolved. The policy of “divide and rule” under these circumstances made things easy for it, since its penetration to the East would cross the “undisciplined” and unpredicted Christian Balkan states as far as their preferences were concerned. Turkey has already promised “earth and water”.

So, on the night of the 29/30 June 1913 (BW II) the Bulgarian Forces attacked Greece and Serbia without declaring war. But in the battles of Kilkis and Gevgeli respectively they suffered complete catastrophe and the two allies advanced into Bulgarian territory. At the same time, Romanian forces crossed the Danube and advanced. Bulgaria now, in a desperate position, turned to Russia, which intervened with a note verbale on 10 July 1913. However the Allies did not take it seriously, since all the Great Powers, despite their fear of a generalised war in the whole of Europe and their will of direct pacification, kept a neutral position, no matter the outcome of war. Constantine’s judgement was right, when he wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Koromilas, expressing his views on Russia’s intervention. “… We must not forget that the solution that Russia or the other Great Powers could suggest before the war would actually be a seed of war, which would burst inevitably after a few years. The current major advantage is that we shall not have to worry about Bulgaria for the generations to come. This advantage should not be lost. In any case, do not consent to a truce, before consulting me. “Ceretum censeo Bulgariam esse delendam (about everything else, I believe Bulgaria must be obliterated (militarily): a paraphrase of Hannibal’s saying)”. ¹² Besides, the genocide methods that the Bulgarian troops implemented in the Greek regions under their occupation were still very recent.

Romania intervened, because it wanted to have a say in the formation of the Balkan balance. In its case, one should seek instigation by France, since, Bucharest followed a policy independently of the Triple Alliance which is of great importance. Under this light, Romania did not wish a Bulgarian supremacy in the Balkans and exploited the fear of the other Powers regarding possible Russian domination.

Turkey, taking advantage of the situation, advanced its troops towards the Ainos-Media line, which was adjudicated in London, while it occupied Andrianople.

This is the time when it is clear that the military power permitted Greece and the rest of the Balkans to have a status of increased political autonomy for the first time.

After the occupation of Sofia’s by the Romanians and the occupation of Adrianople’s by the Turks, the Bulgarians were obliged in the peace Treaty that they signed (29 September 1913), to surrender the territories of Kavala and Andrianople, since only Russia supported them. The rest of the Entente Cordiale and the Central Empires allies did not desire the Slavic descent towards the Aegean. So Constantine’s pertinacity , despite Venizelos’s allusions for submissiveness in the issue of Kavala, triumphed.

 

THE DIPLOMATIC FRENZY ON THE EVE AND AT THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR I

The clouds of World War I were spreading dangerously and Greece was trying to find support on the two coalitions. The French ambassador in Vienna, Alfred Dumaine, described in detail the dire Greek position of that time, since it needed England against Slavism, France against the Italian Imperialism, maybe Entente Cordiale against the Triple Alliance’s ambitions in the Mediterranean and Asia Minor. The role that Greece had to play was overwhelming, despite its victories.

Both Bulgaria and Turkey were once again the “bone of contention” for the two coalitions. Both after their humiliation fostered hereditary hostility for Greece, which was concerned when it saw the Bulgarian King Ferdinand be accepted in Austria as “the prodigal son”.

Having already settled in Albania and Rhodes and with the problem of the Aegean Islands unresolved, Italy had the fever of expansion. All agreed for the Aegean Islands to be given to Greece, in return for the “confinement” of Northern Epirus in Albania (Triple Alliance’s request). Indicative however were the statements of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonino Paternò-Castello, sesto marchese di San Giuliano to the French, that “serious anomalies would arise, if the Dodecanese were also given to Greece, since this would allow them to develop a “propaganda” in Asia Minor … Italy would do its best for Turkey to benefit the most by its withdrawal. Besides, the issue of the islands is connected with the respective one of the southern borders of Albania”. Italy’s fears for the revival of a new Byzantine Empire were catalytic to the formulation of its further position. Thus, at the conference of the Powers’ ambassadors in London (12 August 1913), the grounds were established for the Italians keeping the Dodecanese, despite the French reaction. The rest of the liberated islands were given to Greece (Greek-Turkish Treaty of Athens, 13 November 1913).

A new Italian “blow” for Greece followed, with the support of the Central Union, through the integration of the ancient Greek land of northern Epirus to the new state of Albania (Florence protocol, 19 December 1913). The Greek leadership accepted it, due to assurances regarding the integration of the Dodecanese as well. So, it abandoned the Greeks of northern Epirus who had rebelled, by withdrawing the Hellenic Army from the region, despite its glorious victories against the Albanians supported by the Central Union and Italy. It even abandoned the milder Corfu Protocol (17 May 1914) regarding the people of northern Epirus, which recognised the autonomy of the region; a protocol which was never implemented and was never annulled to this day.

In a Europe which looked like a “boiling cauldron”, such promises were uncertain. The fate of Hellenism was in the centrepiece of the claim of Mediterranean supremacy and by extension of the World, by the Triple Alliance and Entente Cordiale, for which Germanism fought with Slavism, England with Germany or Russia: it was about the most difficult problem of the world and Greece was so tiny. Venizelos travelled to the European capitals. The message of the French ambassador, Jules Cambon, to Berlin (22 November 1913) left no doubts that Germany had abandoned diplomacy. Rome was reassuring only rhetorically. Everyone prepared for war.

Paris dispatched military mission under General Joseph-Paul Eydoux to Greece, almost simultaneously with the dispatch of General Otto Liman von Sanders from Germany to Constantinople, under whose guidance began the genocide of Asia Minor’s Christian population (1912). France armed Greece, while it promised loans, together with England. The Kaiser, along with Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hoolweg arrived in Corfu for “vacations” and discussions with the King and the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs George Streit. Wilhelm was certain about Greece’s alliance, but Streit pointed out that this was impossible due to the threat from Bulgaria and England, as well, which would intervene and given that Greece is a naval country, it would easily be exposed to English fatal blows.

With the completion of the Turkish-Serbian negotiations (17 March 1913), Paris accorded a loan amounting to 500 million francs that Turkey requested. So, the latter became more uncompromising regarding Greece, due to the Italian position as well. It also gave the impression that it had decided to engage in war as well. The barbarian persecutions against the Greeks started once again in Thrace and Asia Minor. The French ambassador in Constantinople, Maurice Bompard, reported to Paris: “The Balkans are at this moment almost totally a theatre of atrocities, which could be compared only with those of the great migrations of people”. ¹³ The crisis has just been defused, however Greece turned to Serbia to activate their agreement. The latter suggested composure, due to the unpreparedness of its army and public opinion’s. Romania, which did not want to risk its gains by remaining inactive, supported the Greek-Serbian side, tepidly.

The pretext/excuse for the breakout of World War I was the assassination of the Austrian archduke, Ferdinand, in Sarajevo, by the Serbian organisation “Black Hand”. Greece was isolated.

 

THE GREEK NEUTRALITY (1914-1915)

The Austrian ultimatum towards Serbia brought about the request of the latter for Greece’s support. Venizelos instructed Streit to give an answer similar to the one Greece had also received from Serbia, when Greek-Turkish relations deteriorated. Without doubt this correlation was politically right. However, Serbia, in addition to the danger of an Austrian-Hungarian attack, faced the danger of a simultaneous Bulgarian attack.

Venizelos instructed the Greek embassy in Bucharest to conclude a Greek-Romanian agreement: “Romania will undoubtedly, like us, be determined not to tolerate such an attack. The Greek-Romanian Treaty would have provided which measures could be jointly adopted, to draw Sofia’s attention or in case of emergency, to disrupt its actions. This agreement was desirable for one more reason: it would force Turkey to strict neutrality”. ¹⁴

After the end of the Austrian ultimatum the Germans, warned the Hellenic government not to intervene in the imminent Austrian-Serbian conflict, stressing the indirect threat of the crisis exploitation by Turkey and Bulgaria. It wished all the more so the “timely defection of Greece from Serbia”.

Venizelos’ telegram to Streit was characteristic, mentioning that in case of a Serbian-Bulgarian conflict, Greece would support Serbia, since its survival depended on this. While in a question posed by the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, he replied (25 July 1914) that as far as Austria was concerned, Greece would decide, taking always under consideration the effectiveness of its assistance.

Venizelos thought that, no matter the outcome of war, Greece could not join the side opposing Serbia, due to the traditional, moderate Greek-Serbian relations. However, after the war was declared, Greece avoided mobilising the 40.000 men provided in the Greek-Serbian agreement, not to provoke a generalised Bulgarian mobilisation and by extension, a general Balkan flare up. The German Kaiser, through telegrams to Constantine (2 and 4 August 1914) informed him of the alliances already concluded with Bulgaria and Turkey, to block the exit of Slavism towards the Aegean and pushed him to form an alliance with them. Constantine replied that in strategic terms it is impossible, since in such a case, the Greek mobilisation, due to lack of ground means (railways and routes), would have to be conducted by sea. Then Greece would inevitably be at the mercy of the English-French, who would destroy it militarily, before it could even support the operations. This is the reason Greece chose strict neutrality.

It should be pointed out that Germany proved extremely skilful in secret diplomacy: not being able to go into partnership with pro-Entente Cordiale Greece, it was seeking its neutrality, keeping Turkey and Bulgaria in suspense, so that they too appeared “neutral”. So, Greece was in a state of uncertainty regarding its participation in the World War I.

Under such circumstances of terrible pressure on a small country which was struggling for its survival, political turmoil was expected. Venizelos firmly believed in Entente Cordiale’s victory as a coalition of strong naval states. He had no scruples about negotiating even the concession of Macedonia to Bulgaria, since Entente Cordiale was already negotiating about the region with the Bulgarians and Thrace and the islands with the Turks to approach them. In other words, he was trying to minimise the inevitable territorial losses, due to policy of Entente Cordiale’s. If, indeed, Bulgaria and Turkey sided finally with the Central Union, Greece could, along with the winners, seek the realisation of the “Great Idea”. Entente Cordiale itself to serve its own interests, as well, correlated the acceptance of Greece as an ally with the hostility or not of the Turks and the Bulgarians. Of course, their policy originated from the Russian-Italian cynical reactions regarding a possible reinforcement and expansion of Greece. In a few words, the latter was an unwanted ally, from the moment it made any demands. They wanted it as an ally, without any guarantee at all, having decided to “mutilate” her, in order to ensure even the neutrality, especially of the Bulgarians. “Bulgaria was the core of politics in the Balkans” according to Entente Cordiale, this is why they even offered it Adrianople as a gift. It came as no surprise that Turkey entered the war in favour of Germany. Venizelos in vain tried to convince Entente Cordiale about the secret Bulgarian-German alliance. What was the reply? : “Impossible, impossible and if this is happening, we shall detach it from Germany promising more concessions” ¹⁵ They needed it more now as an obstacle for Turkey. Théophile Delcassé states: “The trophies of victory will be finally distributed by Entente Cordiale’s forces and their price will be very high […] I believe that it is necessary that England, France and Russia point out to Bulgaria that, if it remains neutral, Entente Cordiale guarantees that, when the time comes for the final arrangement, they will concede it the Ainos-Media line and large territories in Macedonia, which of course will be greater in number, if, instead of neutrality, it chose the cooperation” (14 November 1914). ¹⁶

Constantine, loyal to the principle that you do not sell out national triumphs acquired through major bloodshed for other gains, rejected these “Venizelian” acrobatics, at the moment indeed that Romania depended its alliance with Entente Cordiale on whether they would concede it more territories. So, it maintained its neutrality, since furthermore the Russian front was collapsing and it would have to face alone the main body of the German/Austrian-Hungarian armies. The whole of Greece turned against Entente Cordiale with virtuous indignation. The latter performed a tragic landing in the Dardanelles, without taking under consideration the accurate, as proved later, advice of the Hellenic staff to the opposite. Venizelos, who had suggested the deployment of a symbolic Hellenic force in the operation, which was accepted by the Palace and the Russians and the Italians as well, resigned, accusing, Constantine of pro-germanism to Entente Cordiale. However, Constantine, although essentially pro-Entente Cordiale, could not “enter” the war without Romania’s support and the deployment of at least 150.000 men of Entente Cordiale in Macedonia. The seeds of division were planted.

Gounaris’ new government was seen with hostility by Entente Cordiale, despite the reasonable and compromising proposals towards it, for Greece’s participation in the war on its side. Instead, the alliance not only gave nothing in return, but also suggested the concession of eastern Macedonia and Thrace to the Bulgarians, even by force. This was something that the Russian’s humiliating defeats dictated (Entente Cordiale’s decision, dated 2 June 1915). Bulgaria finally signed a secret agreement with the Germans, while Serbia then sustained all the load of the central Empires, but was abandoned by Entente Cordiale (like Greece), in order to satisfy Bulgaria. Entente Cordiale, with a note verbale, requested the concession of Serbian and Greek territory (Kavala) to the Bulgarians. The latter, to gain time, rejected this note verbale.

After September 1915, Greece was in the centre of the diplomatic war. With the predicted crash of Serbia, the German-Austrians would unite with the Bulgarians and the Turks, would dominate the Aegean, the Mediterranean, following the route to Baghdad and Suez; they would instigate the Muslim world against the colonial forces of Entente Cordiale: the East would be theirs, along with victory and world supremacy (later on, Sir Halford John Mackinder’s dogma). Besides, it is in the East that the greatest empires are created or collapse. The naval domination of Entente Cordiale could easily collapse. Therefore, a continental support point was needed to stop the “Drang nach Südosten”. Thessalonica and Macedonia now appeared as the only solution, as bases to support Serbia, supervise Bulgaria and provide defence. In the beginning of September 1915, Entente Cordiale’s allies were discussing the occupation of the city, in order to offer Macedonia as a “bargaining card”, to Bulgaria if it acceded to the Entente Cordiale. Of course, the problem of Kavala existed no more. Venizelos’ hands were now “free”, while due to the Russian defeat, it was “permitted” to the Greeks to turn to Constantinople.

Serbia then attached the two empires and requested Greek support. Greece replied that it could not help without Romania’s participation. Entente Cordiale shared the same opinion and on 15 September 1915 forwarded a quasi-ultimatum to Bulgaria to take a position. On 21 September 1915, the latter declared a mobilisation, without making it clear with whom it was to be allied with. Greece immediately mobilised as well, while Venizelos initiated direct contacts with Entente Cordiale’s ambassadors, by-passing the Palace. On 23 September 1915, Entente Cordiale declared that it was ready to send the troops that Greece requested. But on 26 September 1915, Romania rejected to support Entente Cordiale and received Russia’s threat that it would invade to support Serbia (the Russian-German front had been stabilised). Romania replied that it would take to arms to avert the invasion. Finally, instead of 150.000 men, Entente Cordiale sent just 20.000 to Macedonia. Venizelos asked the King to permit the landing, but the latter, simply, rejected it for the following reasons: 1) There was insufficient allied support, with Romania outside Entente Cordiale and by extension Russia’s weakness to intervene and 2) Bulgaria, hypocritically, appeared to be still neutral, and Greece was not legalised to permit this landing, because it would cause the anger of German-Austrians and the benefit of the Bulgarians.

Venizelos secretly agreed with Entente Cordiale’s ambassadors to disembark its army in Thessalonica, with the excuse of supporting Serbia, towards which it was directed, without asking for territorial concessions, provided that Bulgaria would not attack. The Parliament and the Palace agreed, without been informed of Venizelos’ secret consultations. England declared that Entente Cordiale took Bulgaria into account despite its apparent neutrality, dropping the hint that it sought to occupy Macedonia on behalf of Bulgaria! Venizelos reacted and did not approve the landing and England withdrew, since some alarming signs appeared in Bulgaria.

Entente Cordiale came back to this and declared that it decided to disembark its troops. Venizelos -as it had been secretly decided again- protested “for appearance’s sake” and the landing was realised, as the Commander of C’ Army Corps had contacted him. The latter revealed his intentions to the Parliament (4 October 1915) and using the parliamentary majority, he sided with Entente Cordiale and declared in the war. On 5 October 1915, the King expelled him and appointed Zaimis as Prime Minister. On 8 October 1915 Belgrade was seized, while on 11 October 1915 the Bulgarians attacked Serbia. The Serbians collapsed and asked for assistance. Zaimis rejected it, translating the Greek-Serbian agreement under the light of the Greek interests. Venizelos agreed mostly with this line and pressured Entente Cordiale, since the Bulgarians and Turks were now on the opposite side, to promise Greece significant territorial gains. Thus, England offered Cyprus. Zaimis rejected it, since the Greek support to Serbia would be ineffective and the survival of the country was doubtful. Indeed, on 27 October 1915, General Maurice-Paul-Emmanuel Sarrail was pursued, defeated by the Bulgarians. Zaimis called the French ambassador and announced to him the disarmament and the confinement in a camp of the pursued Serbian army, which might enter the Hellenic territory, pointing out though that Greece was morally and practically incapable of doing the same with the English-French troops. He continued pointing out: “Since Greece does not have the capability as well to stop the German or the Bulgarian forces that would pursue the allied ones, without engaging in hostilities, it is obliged to reduce the size of the Hellenic territory, which will become a battlefield”. ¹⁷

In November, Zaimis was overthrown by the Venizelians in the Parliament and Skouloudis succeeded him with an all-party government, while in France as well Théophile Delcassé was overwhelmed by Aristide Briand. The enemy troops were just a few kilometres from Thessalonica, while Sarrail had only 30-35 thousand men.

 

1) Entente Cordiale’s conflict with Greece (1915-1916)

Vested interests do not obey the law, so Entente Cordiale notified Skouloudis that any attempt to disarm the allied troops would be considered a hostile act.

However, Constantine was categorical to Denys Cochin: he had no intention at all to disarm any allied army. The official announcement was “to keep up appearances”. The situation of the allies was distressing, as the Greek side and the military genius of Ioannis Metaxas had predicted.

A new note verbale by Entente Cordiale on 22 November 1915, restored things, by accepting the Greek neutrality, but they required absolute freedom of movement in the Hellenic territory, for their troops’ rescue in Macedonia.

Time is of the essence. Constantine however, rose to the occasion and accepted the note verbale (24 November 1915). The Entente Cordiale’s troops were however in the most terrible position. They returned and asked Constantine to close the borders to the opponent armies as soon as their troops passed, for as long as they needed to regroup.

Then the Germans pressed intolerably for invasion in the Hellenic territory. An exchange of letters from both sides followed, the core of which was: a) the assurance of guarantees and “pledges” by the German side that in no way Bulgaria would acquire any moral support or other, during the passage of the German troops from Macedonia, b) that after the end of the imminent operations, the Hellenic sovereignty would be restored and c) that there would be compensations.

Meanwhile, Entente Cordiale occupied Corfu, mainly to save the remaining Serbian troops, performing symbolic actions which abolished the Greek neutrality. At the same time, indirectly but clearly as well, they posed a question for the regime in Greece (note verbale of 14 January 1916), choosing in essence the solution of deposed Venizelos, a fact which coincided with respective extremely provocative actions of General Sarrail in Thessalonica.

 

2) Coup in Thessalonica - The Division

Venizelos was overtly blaming the Palace then of pro-germanism and advised Entente Cordiale to adopt methods of smooth overthrow of the Monarch. The opportunity emerged with the permission of the Greek leadership to the German-Bulgarian troops to occupy the Roupel Passage and other eastern Macedonia territory. However, tactically speaking (of neutrality), this action was the correct one, since a similar permission had been given to Entente Cordiale as well, regarding Thessalonica and western Macedonia. But, ethically speaking, it was a huge mistake. Areas which had suffered bloodshed during the last Bulgarian occupation lived again the same situation. Even the Palace’s followers were stunned. But it should be pointed out that Sarrail had already under his command 150.000 men and he could easily occupy Roupel first. Nevertheless, he let his opponents do it first. Why? The most possible and logical reply is so that Venizelos could assume power and Entente Cordiale would put an end to the “annoying” Greek neutrality. But even Russia faced Sarrail’s actions with disbelief. It considered that he had his eyes turned mostly towards Athens, rather than the hostile Sofia.

Entente Cordiale needed the Macedonian front for the strategic reasons mentioned above. Furthermore, tactically speaking, through this, it would strike the flanks and it would create a diversion to the Central Empires since in the Western (France) and Eastern (Russia) fronts as well the situation had been stabilised and the first were not sure anymore for their final victory. A new front in the rear would have been a serious problem for them.

Finally, after the Italian mainly but also the English objections as well, the King’s overthrow was not realised, but Skouloudis’ government fell and Alexandros Zaimis took power. The latter was in favour of the declaring the war, provided however that Entente Cordiale would treat Greece as an ally, conceding territory in case of a victory and not as a pariah and servant. It was a critical period which demanded the parties’ unanimity.

Entente Cordiale invested in Venizelos. With the elections coming up (17 September 1916), the English-French tried to keep up appearances. But the allies’ interests were identical to Venizelos, so it was imperative to support him actively, but discretely as well. Athens then was shaking from the ground up, because of the fanaticism and the demonstrations of the two parties.

The King in vain tried to convince, through the envoy of his brothers, princes Nikolaos and Andreas to Europe, about his pro-Entente Cordiale feelings and that the only thing he wanted was to fight with them, provided that the Greek territorial integrity would be ensured. Entente Cordiale had already taken a decision about his overthrow and Venizelos’s promotion to power.

The Bulgarians had already advanced in eastern Macedonia, while Romania joined the war (26 August 1916) later, mainly due to the continuous “childish” withdrawals of the Czar, who, depending on the situation at his front, defeats or victories, opted for or against Romania’s alliance. The latter, in order to join the war, was promised significant territorial benefits. However, the situation for the Romanians was difficult. The Bulgarians attacked them from the south and the Russians stopped their attack against the Germans-Austrians. The support promised by Sarrail, as a prerequisite for the Romanian declaration of war, never came. The first unfortunately had his eyes on “hostile” Athens, due to the impulsive instigations of the Venizelians. That is why an English minister commented that Sarrail was equally neutral as Constantine. On 31 August 1916, Colonel Zimbrakakis’ XI Infantry Division rebelled against the King. The move would be stillborn, if it did not receive Sarrail’s assistance.

Meanwhile, the Bulgarians occupied Kavala, the city which for three years, due to the circumstances, was considered symbol of national integrity. Now it was Venizelos who accused Constantine of renouncing it. What an irony …

Zaimis, in the middle of the storm, resigned. The elections of 21 June 1916, which Entente Cordiale’s allies had requested along with the demobilization of the Hellenic Army, were prohibited by them, after realising that Venizelos was not going to win. Kalogeropoulos’s temporary government was quarantined by Entente Cordiale’s troops, which occupied Athens. Constantine though ha already convinced the Russians of his sincerity and demanded for Eastern Rumelia, Northern Epirus, and the Dodecanese, as return gifts for the Greek joining the war. As a reply, he received vague French promises.

At the same time Romania had reached a most humiliating situation. Venizelos realized what was expected. With the royalist officers Danglis and Kountouriotis he went aboard HRS “Esperia” and sailed for Thessalonica, where they organised the “National Defence” movement; the King is stunned. N Politis (Director of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) followed them, as foreign minister of the new Venizelos government. Venizelos demanded de jure recognition of his government by the Entente Cordiale, which, to his great disappointment, recognised it de facto. Greece’s division was complete, splitting the country in two. Entente Cordiale’s allies, except the French, disagreed with this polarisation, since they wanted the whole of Greece on their side and mainly without return gifts and even now they were thinking of extracting Bulgaria from the Central Union, given that the latter’s victory was after all at stake and they did not really need Greece.

The “state of Athens” was under military blockade and famine was spreading all over. However, Constantine provided Entente Cordiale with the armament of the army loyal to him to the Entente Cordiale’s troops, on the condition that the agreement remained secret, so that there would be no German reprisals (meetings on 22 and 24 October 1916 with the French envoy and advisor in matters of war budget, Paul Louis Théodore Bénazet). Entente Cordiale was convinced that after all, reconciliation was in Venizelos’ hands. Bénazet, although promised by Venizelos that he would not move against royalist Units, unfortunately this was not achieved, resulting in a civil conflict in Aikaterini and in the annulment, de facto, of the agreement which would have ended the division of the nation.

France, using Bénazet’s agreement, would exercise a primary role in the Greek issues and that was something that England could not permit. That is why they discarded Bénazet’s mediation and adopted completely Venizelos’ policy, drugging along inevitably the whole Entente Cordiale, in a policy of a frenzied bidding towards the latter (Venizelos).

Isolated battles took place in Athens, between the Entente Cordiale’s invading troops and royalist military Units and the populace. The palace was bombarded.

On 24 November 1916, the National Defence government officially declared the war against Germany. But Romania had been crushed. The Athens blockade continued and the English-French alone decided to overthrow Constantine. But they faced the absolute rejection of their other allies (Italy, Russia) and the USA (allay since 2 April 1916) and they stepped back. Finally, Constantine was overthrown and his second-born son, Alexandros, was crowned King.

The Greek forces were crowned with victory in Macedonia (Battle of Skra di Legen), the Central Union was defeated and the end of war (Sevres Treaty, 10 August 1920) found Greece possessing the areas of Smyrna and eastern Thrace, while the Dardanelles with Constantinople were in an international zone, under allied domination. Dreams dating back many centuries became reality.

 

CONCLUSIONS-EPILOGUE

This period, although it had its own dynamics, cannot be isolated from the second half of the 19^th century, where it has its roots. Especially the facts that caused the victorious for Hellenism Macedonian struggle and the Cretan rebellions formed in essence the catalysts and time-bombs of the Balkan Wars. The latter were a landmark for the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula, because the liberation of their land, which was enslaved for centuries, was the outcome of their increased military power, which gave them an increased political autonomy against the Great Powers.

Furthermore, these wars stabilised and set the srereotypes for the following time periods the Greek-Turkish, the Greek-Bulgarian and by extension the relations among the Peninsula states.

The coup in Goudi, which preceded the above, found in the course of time its personal speaker, in the person of Venizelos, who, along with Constantine, were the co-creators of the new (greater) Greece. Besides, the coup itself expressed the pains and fervent wishes of the Greek people, of the free, as well as of the enslaved lands, to extract the root of the miserable policy of the “impeccable position”, mainly against the Great Powers and the insidious neighbours as well. It has been acknowledged to this day by the people and the world bibliography, as the most successful military coup, which BLOODLESSLY completely achieved its goals, satisfying our national dreams. It was the herald of triumphs of the Balkan wars and led to the actual exploitation of the sacrifices of the epic of the Macedonian Struggle.

So, on the eve of World War I, Greece has doubled in size and is militarily strong, but placed in between two rival “mammoths”, whose antagonism jeopardised the previous benefits and its survival as a nation.

Entente Cordiale would have gained many benefits, if it had treated Greece honestly and gained its support. Greece was united, enthusiastic and devoted to the pursuit of the liberation of its unredeemed lands; the country had unparalleled powers to achieve great accomplishments, as history always reserves to all major moral powers. But as all the great in the course of time, so did Entente Cordiale, obey to their interests and not the common sense of justice. They used political methods, based on bargain and intrigues. They were mocked the Great Idea, because they were afraid of it. They preferred to exploit the Greek civil disputes, to instigate and sustain them. It was a sleazy game, one of those in which the player always loses.

The overthrow of a popular King was not easy. No other Greek King was as popular as the victorious army commander- liberator Constantine. Besides the mystic influence of his name -indeed Constantinople now seemed very near- the Greeks are a nation impassioned with freedom. They were attached to their King with a devotion proportional to that of his pursuit by the foreigners. One socialist Macedonian Member of Parliament stated in a French diplomat: “The equation of Greece with Venizelos is a huge mistake of Entente Cordiale. The Greek people detest the dilemma of choosing between his King and Venizelos, while Entente Cordiale forced them to choose. But hearts cannot be forced and all the sufferings come from this tactic of yours”.¹⁸

On the contrary, Germany proved extremely skilful in secret diplomacy: not being able to go into partnership with Greece, it pursued its neutrality, keeping Turkey and Bulgaria in suspense, so that they appeared neutral. So, Greece was in a state of uncertainty on whether to join the war or not.

Despite the Entente Cordiale’s serious mistakes, the friendly feelings towards it were still almost unanimous. There was no government in Athens, which would declare war against Entente Cordiale. The non-realisation in 1914 and 1915 of the official alliance and the brotherhood-in-arms was not a Greek mistake. The responsibility was borne by Entente Cordiale, which stood against the ambitions of Hellenism. The King, contradicting his own commitments, finally compromised with a simple guarantee about preserving the Greek borders, but the Allies replied with Greece’s mutilation. How could the supreme authority consent to that?

In essence, Entente Cordiale did not have an eastern policy. It supported Bulgaria fully, instead of supporting and unifying from the beginning all the States that were sympathetic: Greece-Serbia-Romania. Instead of that, it let Serbia and Romania collapse ingloriously. In this light, it fell in the ambush of the Central Union, regardless if finally the Greek front, with the valuable support of the Hellenic Army, achieved a decisive victory for the whole course of the war.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Edouard Driault: “Greece and the World War I”, Pelasgos Publishing, Athens 2000

2. K.Svolopoulou: “The Greek Foreign Policy”, Sakkoula Publishing, Thessalonica 1983

3. P. Panagakou: “Contribution in the history of the 1912-22 Decade”, Athens 1960

4. D D Soulis (Major, Infantry) “ The Second Balkan War against the Bulgarians 1913”, N Tylperoglou Publishing, Athens 1934

5. Chr Price (‘Times’ Correspondent): “The Balkan Struggles,” Ekati Publishing, Athens 1915

6. D D Soulis (Lt Col, Infantry): “The Balkan Wars 1912-13”, C’ Vol, Military Academy, Athens 1936

7. Diplomatic documents 1913-17 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “Greek-Serbian Alliance Treaty/German-Bulgarian Invasion in Macedonia”, Athens 1917

8. Paraskevas Antonis Printing Office: “1913-16, Between Eves of the Balkan Peace”, Athens 1916

9. N Ivanoff (Lt Gen): “The Balkan War”

10. Athan Kokkoris (Lt Col, Arty): “Military History, Balkan Wars 1912-13”, Military Academy, Studies Division, Athens 1956

11. Sergiou A. Galistra: “National Struggles 1909-1959”, Estia Bookstore, Athens 1963

12. N Vlachou: “The Bulgarian contestation regarding the priority of Thessalonica’s occupation by the Hellenic Army in 1912”, (Offprint from the Greek annex, Nr 4) Thessalonica 1953

13. Al .Chapman (Captain, “Daily Telegraph” war correspondent) “The war of Greece and Bulgaria, Athens (Dec 1913-Jan 1914), Theodoropoulos Translation

14. Vict. Dousmanis: “The allied war against the Bulgarians”, AEVE PV Makris and Corporation Publishing, Athens May 1927

15. P D Sakellariou Printing: “The Bulgarian atrocities in the Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, 1912-13”, Athens 1914