Έτσι ενεργούν τα Κράτη που γνωρίζουν το συμφέρον τους !  

Για την Ελλάδα αυτά αποτελούν «ταμπού»  που απαγορεύεται να τα θίξουμε ...

Σχόλιο κ. Χολέβα Κων. :  Δελτίο Τύπου στα αγγλικά από μία ενδιαφέρουσα απόφαση του Γερμανικού

 Συνταγματικού Δικαστηρίου της 30-6-2009, το οποίο έκρινε ότι η Συνθήκη της Λισσαβόνας είναι μεν συμβατή

 με το Γερμανικό Σύνταγμα, με την προϋπόθεση ότι η Γερμανία θα διατηρεί την εθνική κυριαρχία της σε ορισμένους

 τομείς όπως η Άμυνα, η ασφάλεια, η παιδεία, ο πολιτισμός, οι σχέσεις Εκκλησίας-πολιτείας, 

ο έλεγχος των ΜΜΕ κ.α. Στους τομείς αυτούς θα νομοθετεί πρωτίστως η Γερμανία 

και η Ε.Ε. θα παρεμβαίνει ελάχιστα έως καθόλου (βλέπε κυρίως ενότητα 2, παράγραφο c). 

Τα εθνικά κράτη ανθίστανται στην ιδέα του ευρωπαϊκού υπερκράτους, 

αλλά τα ελληνικά ΜΜΕ ελάχιστα το προβάλλουν.

 Μετά το αγγλικό κείμενο διαβάστε στο τέλος εύστοχο σχόλιο έλληνα δημοσιογράφου: 

(ΓΕΡΜΑΝΙΑ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΣΥΝΘΗΚΗ ΤΗΣ ΛΙΣΑΒΩΝΑΣ)

ΑΓΓΛΙΚΟ ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ :  

Federal Constitutional Court - Press office -

Press release no. 72/2009 of 30 June 2009

Judgment of 30 June 2009

Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon compatible with the Basic Law;

accompanying law unconstitutional to the extent that legislative bodies

have not been accorded sufficient rights of participation 

http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-072en.html 

The Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court has decided today 

that the Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon (Zustimmungsgesetz zum 

Vertrag von Lissabon) is compatible with the Basic Law. In contrast, the 

Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the 

Bundesrat in European Union Matters (Gesetz über die Ausweitung und 

Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in 

Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union) infringes Article 38.1 in 

conjunction with Article 23.1 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz - GG) 

insofar as the Bundestag and the Bundesrat have not been accorded 

sufficient rights of participation in European lawmaking procedures and 

treaty amendment procedures. The Federal Republic of Germany’s 

instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon may not be deposited 

as long as the constitutionally required legal elaboration of the 

parliamentary rights of participation has not entered into force. The 

decision was reached unanimously as regards the result, by seven votes 

to one as regards the reasoning (for the facts see German press releases 

no. 2/2009 of 16 January 2009 and no. 9/2009 of 29 January 2009). 

In essence, the decision is based on the following considerations:

1. Overview of the central aspects of the judgment

The judgment focuses on the connection between the democratic system 

prescribed by the Basic Law on the level of the Federation and the level 

of independent rule which has been reached on the European level. The 

structural problem of the European Union is at the centre of the review 

of constitutionality. The extent of the Union’s freedom of action has 

steadily and considerably increased, not least by the Treaty of Lisbon, 

so that meanwhile in some fields of policy, the European Union has a 

shape that corresponds to that of a federal state, i.e. is analogous to 

that of a state. In contrast, the internal decision-making and 

appointment procedures remain predominantly committed to the pattern of 

an international organisation, i.e. are analogous to international law; 

as before, the structure of the European Union essentially follows the 

principle of the equality of states. 

As long as, consequently, no uniform European people, as the subject of 

legitimisation, can express its majority will in a politically effective 

manner that takes due account of equality in the context of the 

foundation of a European federal state, the peoples of the European 

Union, which are constituted in their Member States, remain the decisive 

holders of public authority, including Union authority. In Germany, 

accession to a European federal state would require the creation of a 

new constitution, which would go along with the declared waiver of the 

sovereign statehood safeguarded by the Basic Law. There is no such act 

here. The European Union continues to constitute a union of rule 

(Herrschaftsverband) founded on international law, a union which is 

permanently supported by the intention of the sovereign Member States. 

The primary responsibility for integration is in the hands of the 

national constitutional bodies which act on behalf of the peoples. With 

increasing competences and further independence of the institutions of 

the Union, safeguards that keep up with this development are necessary 

in order to preserve the fundamental principle of conferral exercised in 

a restricted and controlled manner by the Member States. With 

progressing integration, fields of action which are essential for the 

development of the Member States’ democratic opinion-formation must be 

retained. In particular, it must be guaranteed that the responsibility 

for integration can be exercised by the state bodies of representation 

of the peoples. 

The further development of the competences of the European Parliament 

can reduce, but not completely fill, the gap between the extent of the 

decision-making power of the Union’s institutions and the citizens’ 

democratic power of action in the Member States. Neither as regards its 

composition nor its position in the European competence structure is the 

European Parliament sufficiently prepared to take representative and 

assignable majority decisions as uniform decisions on political 

direction. Measured against requirements placed on democracy in states, 

its election does not take due account of equality, and it is not 

competent to take authoritative decisions on political direction in the 

context of the supranational balancing of interest between the states. 

It therefore cannot support a parliamentary government and organise 

itself with regard to party politics in the system of government and 

opposition in such a way that a decision on political direction taken by 

the European electorate could have a politically decisive effect. Due to 

this structural democratic deficit, which cannot be resolved in a 

Staatenverbund, further steps of integration that go beyond the status 

quo may undermine neither the States’ political power of action nor the 

principle of conferral. 

The peoples of the Member States are the holders of the constituent 

power. The Basic Law does not permit the special bodies of the 

legislative, executive and judicial power to dispose of the essential 

elements of the constitution, i.e. of the constitutional identity 

(Article 23.1 sentence 3, Article 79.3 GG). The constitutional identity 

is an inalienable element of the democratic self-determination of a 

people. To ensure the effectiveness of the right to vote and to preserve 

democratic self-determination, it is necessary for the Federal 

Constitutional Court to watch, within the boundaries of its competences, 

over the Community or Union authority’s not violating the constitutional 

identity by its acts and not evidently transgressing the competences 

conferred on it. The transfer of competences, which has been increased 

once again by the Treaty of Lisbon, and the independence of 

decision-making procedures therefore require an effective ultra vires

review and an identity review of instruments of European origin in the 

area of application of the Federal Republic of Germany. 

2. The standard of review

a) The Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon is measured by the Federal 

Constitutional Court against the standard of the right to vote. As a 

right that is equivalent to fundamental right, a violation of the right 

to vote can be challenged by a constitutional complaint (Article 38.1 

sentence 1 in conjunction with Article 93.1 no. 4a GG). The right to 

vote specifies the right to democratic self-determination, to free and 

equal participation in the state authority exercised in Germany and to 

compliance with the principle of democracy including the respect of the 

constituent power of the people. The review of a violation of the right 

to vote also comprises encroachments on the principles which are 

codified in Article 79.3 of the Basic Law as the identity of the 

constitution. The citizens’ right to determine, in equality and freedom, 

public authority affecting them with regard to persons and 

subject-matters through elections and other votes is anchored in human 

dignity and is the fundamental element of the principle of democracy. 

The principle of democracy is not amenable to weighing with other legal 

interests. Amendments of the Basic Law affecting the principles laid 

down in Article 1 and Article 20 of the Basic Law shall be inadmissible 

(Article 79.3 of the Basic Law). The so-called eternity guarantee takes 

the disposal of the identity of the free constitutional order even out 

of the hands of the constitution-amending legislature. The constituent 

power has not granted the representatives and bodies of the people a 

mandate to change the constitutional principles which are fundamental 

pursuant to Article 79.3 GG. 

b) At the same time, the elaboration of the principle of democracy by 

the Basic Law is open to the objective of integrating Germany into an 

international and European peaceful order. The German constitution is 

oriented towards opening the state system of rule to the peaceful 

cooperation of the nations and towards European integration. Neither the 

integration pari passu into the European Union nor the integration into 

peacekeeping systems such as the United Nations necessarily lead to a 

change in the system of exercise of public authority in the Federal 

Republic of Germany. Instead, it is a voluntary, mutual commitment pari 

passu, which secures peace and strengthens the possibilities of shaping 

policy by joint coordinated action. The constitutional mandate to 

realise a united Europe which follows from Article 23.1 of the Basic Law 

and its Preamble means with regard to the German constitutional bodies 

that participation in European integration is not left to their 

political discretion. The Basic Law wants European integration and an 

international peaceful order. Therefore not only the principle of 

openness towards international law (Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit), but 

also the principle of openness towards European law 

(Europarechtsfreundlichkeit) applies. 

c) The authorisation to transfer sovereign powers to the European Union 

pursuant to Article 23.1 GG is, however, granted under the condition 

that the sovereign statehood of a constitutional state is maintained on 

the basis of a responsible integration programme according to the 

principle of conferral and respecting the Member States’ constitutional 

identity, and that at the same time the Federal Republic of Germany does 

not lose its ability to politically and socially shape the living 

conditions on its own responsibility. Article 23.1 GG and the Preamble 

do not say anything about the final character of the political 

organisation of Europe. With its Article 23, the Basic Law grants powers 

to participate and develop a European Union which is designed as an 

association of sovereign national states (Staatenverbund). The concept 

of Verbund covers a close long-term association of states which remain 

sovereign, an association which exercises public authority on the basis 

of a treaty, whose fundamental order is, however, subject to the 

disposal of the Member States alone and in which the peoples of their 

Member States, i.e. the citizens of the states, remain the subjects of 

democratic legitimisation. The European Union must comply with 

democratic principles as regards its nature and extent and also as 

regards its own organisational and procedural elaboration (Article 23.1, 

Article 20.1 and 20.2 in conjunction with Article 79.3 of the Basic 

Law). This means firstly that European integration may not result in the 

system of democratic rule in Germany being undermined. This does not 

mean that a number of sovereign powers which can be determined from the 

outset or specific types of sovereign powers must remain in the hands of 

the state. European unification on the basis of a union of sovereign 

states under the Treaties may, however, not be realised in such a way 

that the Member States do not retain sufficient room for the political 

formation of the economic, cultural and social circumstances of life. 

This applies in particular to areas which shape the citizens’ 

circumstances of life, in particular the private space of their own 

responsibility and of political and social security, which is protected 

by the fundamental rights, and to political decisions that particularly 

depend on previous understanding as regards culture, history and 

language and which unfold in discourses in the space of a political 

public that is organised by party politics and Parliament. To the extent 

that in these areas, which are of particular importance for democracy, a 

transfer of sovereign powers is permitted at all, a narrow 

interpretation is required. This concerns in particular the 

administration of criminal law, the civil and the military monopoly on 

the use of force, fundamental fiscal decisions on revenue and 

expenditure, the shaping of the circumstances of life by social policy 

and important decisions on cultural issues such as the school and 

education system, the provisions governing the media, and dealing with 

religious communities. 

d) The Basic Law does not grant the German state bodies powers to 

transfer sovereign powers in such a way that their exercise can 

independently establish other competences for the European Union. It 

prohibits the transfer of competence to decide on its own competence 

(Kompetenz-Kompetenz). The principle of conferral is therefore not only 

a principle of European law (Article 5.1 of the Treaty on European Union 

; Article 5.1 sentence 1 and 5.12 of the Treaty on European Union 

in its version of the Treaty of Lisbon ), but, just like the 

European Union’s obligation to respect the Member States’ national 

identity (Article 6.3 TEU; Article 4.2 sentence 1 TEU Lisbon), it takes 

up constitutional principles from the Member States. The integration 

programme of the European Union must therefore be sufficiently precise. 

To the extent that the Member States elaborate the law laid down in the 

Treaties in such a way that, with the principle of conferral 

fundamentally continuing to apply, an amendment of the law laid down in 

the Treaties can be brought about without a ratification procedure, a 

special responsibility is incumbent on the legislative bodies, apart 

from the Federal Government, as regards participation, which, in 

Germany, must, on the national level, comply with the requirements under 

Article 23.1 of the Basic Law (responsibility for integration). The act 

approving a treaty amending a European Treaty and the national 

accompanying laws must therefore be such that European integration 

continues to take place according to the principle of conferral without 

the possibility for the European Union of taking possession of 

Kompetenz-Kompetenz or to violate the Member States’ constitutional 

identity which is not amenable to integration, in this case, that of the 

Basic Law. For borderline cases of what is still constitutionally 

admissible, the German legislature must, if necessary, make arrangements 

with its laws that accompany approval to ensure that the responsibility 

for integration of the legislative bodies can sufficiently develop. 

e) The Federal Constitutional Court reviews whether legal instruments of 

the European institutions and bodies, adhering to the principle of 

subsidiarity under Community and Union law (Article 5.2 ECT; Article 5.1 

sentence 2 and 5.3 TEU Lisbon), keep within the boundaries of the 

sovereign powers accorded to them by way of conferred power (ultra vires 

review). Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court reviews whether 

the inviolable core content of the constitutional identity of the Basic 

Law pursuant to Article 23.1 sentence 3 in conjunction with Article 79.3 

of the Basic Law is respected (identity review). The exercise of these 

competences of review, which are constitutionally required, safeguards 

the fundamental political and constitutional structures of sovereign 

Member States, which are recognised by Article 4.2 sentence 1 TEU 

Lisbon, even with progressing integration. Its application in a given 

case follows the principle of the Basic Law’s openness towards European 

Law. 

3. The subsumption

a) There are no decisive constitutional objections to the Act Approving

the Treaty of Lisbon. 

aa) With the present status of integration, the European Union does, 

even upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, not yet attain a 

shape that corresponds to the level of legitimisation of a democracy 

constituted as a state. It is not a federal state but remains an 

association of sovereign states to which the principle of conferral 

applies. 

The European Parliament is not a body of representation of a sovereign 

European people but a supranational body of representation of the 

peoples of the Member States, so that the principle of electoral 

election, which is common to all European states, is not applicable with 

regard to the European Parliament. Other provisions of the Treaty of 

Lisbon, such as the double qualified majority in the Council (Article 

16.4 TEU Lisbon, Article 238.2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 

European Union ), the elements of participative, associative and 

direct democracy (Art. 11 TEU Lisbon) as well as the institutional 

recognition of the national Parliaments (Article 12 TEU Lisbon) cannot 

compensate the deficit of European public authority that exists when 

measured against requirements on democracy in states, but can 

nevertheless increase the level of legitimisation of the Staatenverbund. 

bb) With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Federal 

Republic of Germany will remain a sovereign state. In particular, the 

substance of German state authority is protected. The distribution of 

the European Union’s competences, and their delimitation from those of 

the Member States, takes place according to the principle of conferral 

and according to other mechanisms of protection, in particular according 

to provisions concerning the exercise of competences. The transfer of 

sovereign powers to the European Union, which is thus performed in a 

controlled and responsible manner, is not called into question by 

individual provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon. This applies first of all 

to the simplified amendment procedure (see in particular Article 48.6 

TEU Lisbon). The “approval” of the Federal Republic of Germany in 

simplified revision procedures requires a law within the meaning of 

Article 23.1 sentence 2 of the Basic Law as a lex specialis with regard 

to Article 59.2. 

cc) To the extent that the general bridging clause under Article 48.7 

TEU Lisbon makes possible the transition from the principle of unanimity 

to the principle of qualified majority in the decision-making of the 

Council, or the transition from the special to the ordinary legislative 

procedure, this is also a Treaty amendment under primary law, which is 

to be assessed pursuant to Article 23.1 sentence 2 of the Basic Law. The 

national parliaments’ right to make known their opposition (Article 

48.7(3) TEU Lisbon) is not a sufficient equivalent to the requirement of 

ratification. The representative of the German government in the 

European Council may only consent to a Treaty amendment brought about by 

the application of the general bridging clause if the German Bundestag 

and the Bundesrat have adopted within a period yet to be determined a 

law pursuant to Article 23.1 of the Basic Law, which takes the purpose 

of Article 48.7(3) TEU Lisbon as an orientation. This also applies in 

case of the special bridging clause pursuant to Article 81.3(2) TFEU 

being used. 

dd) A law within the meaning of Article 23.1 sentence 2 of the Basic Law 

is not required to the extent that special bridging clauses are 

restricted to areas which are already sufficiently determined by the 

Treaty of Lisbon, and which do not provide for a right for national 

Parliaments to make known their opposition. Also in these cases, 

however, it is incumbent on the Bundestag and, to the extent that the 

legislative competences of the Länder are affected, on the Bundesrat, to 

comply with their responsibility for integration in another suitable 

manner. The veto right in the Council may not be waived without the 

participation of the competent legislative bodies even as regards 

subject-matters which have already been factually determined in the 

Treaties. The representative of the German government in the European 

Council or in the Council may therefore only consent to an amendment of 

primary legislation through the application of one of the special 

bridging clauses on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany if the 

German Bundestag and, to the extent that this is required by the 

provisions on legislation, the Bundesrat, have approved this decision 

within a period yet to be determined, which takes the purpose of Article 

48.7(3) TEU Lisbon as an orientation. 

ee) Also the flexibility clause under Article 352 TFEU can be construed 

in such a way that the integration programme envisaged in the provisions 

can still be predicted and determined by the German legislative bodies. 

With a view to the undetermined nature of possible cases of application, 

the use of the flexibility clause constitutionally requires ratification 

by the German Bundestag and the Bundesrat on the basis of Article 23.1 

sentences 2 and 3 of the Basic Law. 

ff) The Federal Constitutional Court’s competence of review is not 

affected by Declaration no. 17 on Primacy annexed to the Final Act of 

the Treaty of Lisbon. The foundation and the limit of the applicability 

of European Union law in the Federal Republic of Germany is the order to 

apply the law which is contained in the Act Approving the Treaty of 

Lisbon, which can only be given within the limits of the current 

constitutional order. In this respect, it is insignificant whether the 

primacy of application, which the Federal Constitutional Court has 

already essentially recognised for Community law, is provided for in the 

Treaties themselves or in Declaration no. 17 annexed to the Final Act of 

the Treaty of Lisbon. 

gg) The competences that have been newly established or deepened by the 

Treaty of Lisbon in the areas of judicial cooperation in criminal and 

civil matters, external trade relations, common defence and with regard 

to social concerns can, within the meaning of an interpretation of the 

Treaty that does justice to its purpose, and must, in order to avoid 

imminent unconstitutionality, be exercised by the institutions of the 

European Union in such a way that on the level of the Member States, 

tasks of sufficient weight as to their extent as well as their substance 

remain which legally and practically are the precondition of a living 

democracy. In this context, the following aspects must be given 

particular attention: 

- Due to the fact that democratic self-determination is affected in an 

  especially sensitive manner by provisions of criminal law and law of 

  criminal procedure, the corresponding foundations of competence in the 

  Treaties must be interpreted strictly - on no account extensively -,

  and their use requires particular justification. 

- The use of the dynamic blanket authorisation pursuant to Article 

  83.1(3) TFEU to extend the list of particularly serious crimes with a 

  cross-border dimension “on the basis of developments in crime” is 

  factually tantamount to an extension of the competences of the European 

  Union and is therefore subject to the requirement of the enactment of

  a specific statute under Article 23.1 sentence 2 GG. 

- In the area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, particular 

  requirements must additionally be placed on the provisions which accord 

  a Member State special rights in the legislative procedure (Article 

  82.3, Article 83.3 TFEU: so-called emergency brake procedure). From the 

  perspective of German constitutional law, the necessary measure of 

  democratic legitimisation via the national parliaments can only be 

  safeguarded by the German representative in the Council exercising the 

  Member State’s rights set out in Article 82.3 and Article 83.3 TFEU

  only on the instruction of the Bundestag and, to the extent that this

  is required by the provisions on legislation, of the Bundesrat. 

- The mandatory requirement of parliamentary approval for the deployment 

  of the armed forces abroad will continue to exist upon the entry into 

  force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon does not confer on 

  the European Union the competence to use the Member States’ armed

  forces without the approval of the respective Member State affected or

  of its parliament. It also does not restrict the possibilities of

  action of the German Bundestag in the area of social policy to such an

  extent that this would impair the principle of the social state 

  (Article 23.1 sentence 3 in conjunction with Article 79.3 GG) in a 

  constitutionally objectionable manner and inadmissibly curtail the

  democratic scope for decision-making that is required in this context. 

b) There are also no decisive constitutional objections against the Act 

Amending the Basic Law (Articles 23, 45 and 93) (Gesetz zur Änderung des 

Grundgesetzes ). A violation of democratic 

principles pursuant to Article 79.3 GG occurs neither by Article 23.1a 

GG, new version, which elaborates the right to bring a subsidiarity 

action as a minority right and sets the quorum at one fourth of the 

Members, nor by Article 45 sentence 3 GG, new version. 

c) In contrast, the Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the 

Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union Matters infringes Article 

38.1 in conjunction with Article 23.1 of the Basic Law insofar as rights 

of participation of the German Bundestag and the Bundesrat have not been 

elaborated to the constitutionally required extent. If the Member States 

elaborate the European law laid down in the Treaties on the basis of the 

principle of conferral in such a way that an amendment of the Treaty law 

can be brought about solely or decisively by the institutions of the 

European Union - albeit under the requirement of unanimity in the 

Council -, a special responsibility is incumbent on the national 

constitutional bodies in the context of participation. In Germany, this 

responsibility for integration must on the national level comply with 

the constitutional requirements made in particular under Article 23.1 

GG. 

http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-072en.html

 

http://orfni.blogspot.com/2009/07/blog-post_11.html 

11 Ιούλιος 2009  

Μια μεγάλη στιγμή για την Ευρώπη. Ένα μεγάλο βήμα για τη δημοκρατία.

Ας μη σταθούμε όμως στον απόηχο από τους πανηγυρισμούς.

Κι ας προτείνουμε μια άλλη ανάγνωση της πρόσφατης απόφασης του γερμανικού συνταγματικού δικαστηρίου να δώσει το «πράσινο φως» στη Συνθήκη της Λισαβώνας.

Γιατί οι όροι που έθεσε αναιρούν την ουσία της.

Το δικαστήριο της Καρλσρούης αποδέχτηκε πως η Συνθήκη που ενισχύει τους ευρωπαϊκούς θεσμούς εις βάρος των εθνικών είναι «κατ΄ αρχήν συμβατή» με το γερμανικό Σύνταγμα.

Για να επικυρωθεί όμως από τη γερμανική Βουλή, το δικαστήριο θέτει όρους που ουσιαστικά τη μετατρέπουν στο αντίθετό της.

Η γερμανική απόφαση καθορίζει «βασικούς τομείς» για τους οποίους οι αποφάσεις θα λαμβάνονται κατ΄ εξαίρεση μόνο από τη Γερμανία και όχι από τις Βρυξέλλες: ποινικό δίκαιο, αστυνομία, στρατός, φορολογία, κοινωνική πολιτική, παιδεία, μέσα μαζικής ενημέρωσης.

Απαγορεύει τη μεταβίβαση εξουσιών από τη γερμανική κυβέρνηση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση σε όλους αυτούς τους τομείς.

Και αποφαίνεται πως το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο δεν έχει καμιά δικαιοδοσία να αποφασίζει γι΄ αυτά τα ζητήματα, αφού δεν είναι ένα Σώμα που «εκλέγεται με ισότιμη καθολική ψηφοφορία» και δεν αντιπροσωπεύει τον «κυρίαρχο λαό της Ευρώπης».

Από την Καρλσρούη σηματοδοτείται έτσι μια στροφή της ευρωπαϊκής πολιτικής της Γερμανίας από την εμβάθυνση και τη διεύρυνση της ευρωπαϊκής ολοκλήρωσης στα εθνικά συμφέροντα. Η εφημερίδα «FΑΖ» δεν θα μπορούσε να το είχε γράψει καλύτερα: «Η Καρλσρούη μπορεί να υπογραμμίζει όσο θέλει τα φιλικά της αισθήματα προς την Ευρώπη, αλλά το πραγματικό της μήνυμα είναι αυτό: Εμείς είμαστε αυτοί που φορούν τα παντελόνια». Το αξιοσημείωτο με την απόφαση της Καρλσρούης, όπως παρατηρεί ο Πίτερ Σουόρτς στο «World Socialist», είναι πως αφήνει τις αγορές, τις επιχειρήσεις και τους χρηματοπιστωτικούς θεσμούς απέξω από τους «βασικούς τομείς» που θεωρεί ότι πρέπει να υπάγονται στην εθνική κυριαρχία. Γι΄ αυτό άλλωστε έδωσε κατ΄ αρχήν το «πράσινο φως» στη Συνθήκη. Η απόφαση δεν στρέφεται κατά της εξουσίας των χρηματοπιστωτικών και οικονομικών συμφερόντων που καθορίζουν την πολιτική των Βρυξελλών.

Στόχος της είναι να ενισχύσει τη γερμανική κυριαρχία σε μια περίοδο αυξημένης λαϊκής δυσαρέσκειας και οξυμμένων εθνικών ανταγωνισμών. Με παρόμοια απόφαση το 2007, η βρετανική Βουλή των Λόρδων είχε τραβήξει τις δικές της «κόκκινες γραμμές» για να προστατέψει τη βρετανική κυριαρχία. 

Η γερμανική απόφαση φέρνει σε δύσκολη θέση τις χώρες που έχουν ήδη επικυρώσει τη Συνθήκη άνευ όρων ή εγγυήσεων. Γιατί άραγε θα πρέπει η γερμανική εθνική κυριαρχία να γίνεται πιο σεβαστή από την ιταλική, τη γαλλική ή την ελληνική; Το πολιτικό και οικονομικό μέγεθος της Γερμανίας καθιστά την απάντηση προφανή. Το ίδιο προφανής είναι όμως και η ευκαιρία των λαών να δουν πόσο είναι γυμνοί οι ηγέτες που απεμπόλησαν τα εθνικά τους Συντάγματα και τους έσυραν στην τυφλή επικύρωση της Συνθήκης της Λισαβώνας (καλά, για παντελόνια ούτε λόγος, αλλά ούτε καν μια φουστίτσα;). 

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